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A B S T R A C T
We study a dynamic social choice problem in which a sequence of committees must decide how to consume
a public asset. A committee convened at time t decides on consumption at t, accounting for the behaviour of
future committees. Committee members disagree about the appropriate value of the pure rate of time pref-
erence, but must nevertheless reach a decision. If each committee aggregates its members’ preferences in a
utilitarian manner, the collective preferences of successive committees will be time inconsistent, and they
will implement ineﬃcient consumption plans. If however committees decide on the level of consumption
by amajoritarian vote in each period, theymay improve on the consumption plans implemented by utilitar-
ian committees. Using a simple model, we show that this occurs in empirically plausible cases. Application
to the problem of choosing the social discount rate is discussed.
© 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Suppose that a society needs to decide on an intertemporal con-
sumption plan for somepublic asset. A committee is convened at each
point in time, and tasked with determining howmuch to consume in
the current period. The members of each committee have differing
opinions about the pure rate of social timepreference (PRSTP), or util-
ity discount rate, that should be applied to this problem. Some favour
a high discount rate, while others believe that different time periods
should be treated more equally, and thus favour a low discount rate.
Moreover, the current committee knows that future consumption
choices will also be made by committees exhibiting similar disagree-
ments ondiscount rates. Howshould such committees proceed, given
the heterogeneity in opinions on discount rates?
Although it may seem abstract, this question is inspired by an
important practical problem in public economics: how should gov-
ernments discount future utilities when evaluating public policy
decisions? The appropriate normative value of the PRSTP has been
 AM acknowledges support from the Centre for Climate Change Economics and
Policy, funded by the UK Economic and Social Research Council (ES/K006576/1).
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debated at least since Ramsey’s (1928) seminal work on optimal
national savings. Subsequent commentators have argued the mer-
its of a variety of values for the PRSTP without a clear ‘best’ value
emerging, and different governments have adopted different values
for public decision-making. The social time preferences economists
prescribe for public decision-making today are still highly hetero-
geneous (Arrow et al., 2013). This has been highlighted by the
long-standing debate about the appropriate value of the PRSTP for
the evaluation of climate change policies (Nordhaus, 2008; Stern,
2007). A recent survey of experts on social discounting (Drupp et
al., forthcoming) shows signiﬁcant variation in their prescriptions for
the PRSTP (see Fig. 2).
Given the persistent normative disagreements about the PRSTP,
it is natural to ask whether methods from social choice theory can
be used to obtain a compromise between opposing viewpoints. In
this paper, we examine perhaps the most common such methods:
utilitarian aggregation and majoritarian voting. Under the utilitarian
approach, committees seek to maximize a weighted sum of the time
preferences advocated by their members in each period, while under
majoritarian voting, committee members vote on the current level of
consumption, and a Condorcet winner (if it exists) is implemented.
The utilitarian approach is appealing, as Jackson and Yariv (2015)
have shown that any social choice rule that is non-dictatorial
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.09.005
0047-2727/ © 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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(i.e. sensitive to the preferences of more than one individual)
and respects unanimity (roughly, if everyone prefers consumption
stream C to C′ then C is socially preferred to C′) is equivalent to util-
itarianism in the setting we study. However, while no-dictatorship
and unanimity are compelling properties in isolation, they lead
to a time inconsistency problem when combined with another
assumption: time invariance (i.e. preferences over future consump-
tion streams are identical in all time periods). Millner and Heal
(2018) have argued that while time invariance is an excessively
strong assumption in intra-group intertemporal decision problems
(e.g. allocation between family members), it is plausible when mod-
eling inter-group choices like those facing the successive committees
studied in this paper. Thus, if a utilitarian approach to resolving
disagreements is adopted, the collective preferences of successive
committees will conﬂict with one another. Rational utilitarian com-
mittees will anticipate the actions of future committees, and react
optimally to them, inducing a dynamic game between committees.
The equilibrium of this game will be seen as ineﬃcient by every
committee.
The ineﬃciency of the consumption path implemented by util-
itarian committees means that it is possible that voting could give
rise to superior outcomes. If each committee holds a majoritarian
vote on the level of current consumption, and members of the cur-
rent committee rationally anticipate the outcome of future votes, we
show that the equilibrium consumption path under voting will cor-
respond to the optimal plan of the median member. Further analysis
shows that a majority of committee members will prefer this voting
equilibrium to the utilitarian equilibrium, regardless of the choice of
aggregation weights in the utilitarian objective function. We extend
this result to welfare comparisons, ﬁnding conditions on the dis-
tribution of PRSTPs under which the voting equilibrium is superior
to the utilitarian equilibrium according to utilitarian committees’
own objective functions. Using survey data on economists’ recom-
mended values for the PRSTP, we show that these conditions are
often satisﬁed in practice. There is thus a sense in which voting may
be ‘self-stable’ (Barbera and Jackson, 2004) relative to utilitarianism:
a majoritarian vote between voting and utilitarian aggregation of
PRSTPs will always lead to voting being adopted as the aggregation
method. By contrast, a utilitarian comparison of voting and utilitarian
equilibria will often favour voting.
The paper is structured as follows. We discuss related litera-
ture next, before developing our simple model of dynamic public
choice with disagreements about the PRSTP in Section 2. This section
contains the bulk of our analysis. We ﬁrst derive the equilibrium
behaviour of utilitarian committees, and show that they choose inef-
ﬁcient consumptionpaths. Next,wederive the equilibriumbehaviour
of committees that vote on consumption. Finally, we contrast these
two preference aggregation methods, deriving results on committee
members’ ordinal preferences between the implemented equilibria,
and comparing them from the perspective of utilitarian commit-
tees’ own collective preferences. Section 3 discusses the results, and
draws some lessons for the choice of the PRSTP in social discounting
formulae.
1.1. Related literature
The literature on aggregation of opinions about social discount
rates stems from the work of Weitzman (1998, 2001), who focuses
on aggregation of expert opinions on real (i.e. consumption) discount
rates, rather than pure time preferences. Weitzman takes a sample
of opinions as to the appropriate (constant) real discount rate for
project evaluation, treats these as uncertain estimates of the ‘true’
underlying rate, and takes expectationsof the associateddiscount fac-
tors to derive a declining term structure for the ‘certainty equivalent’
real discount rate. As Freeman and Groom (2015) observe, opinions
about real discount rates conﬂate ethical views aboutwelfare param-
eters such as the PRSTP with empirical estimates of consumption
growth rates — they mix tastes and beliefs (see Dasgupta, 2001 ,
pp. 187–190 and Gollier, 2016 for further discussions of Weitzman’s
approach). This suggests that it is important topursueapproaches that
treat preference aggregation as a distinct problem. Our work high-
lights diﬃculties that may arise in practice when decision-makers
with a distribution of ethical views attempt to form consensus social
preferences, and contrasts the equilibrium outcomes that arise from
standard preference aggregation methods.
The possibility that utilitarian preference aggregation could lead
to time inconsistency when agents favour different values of the
PRSTP has been noted by several authors (Marglin, 1963; Feldstein,
1964; Jackson and Yariv, 2015). Millner and Heal (2018) argue that,
while this is not a generic feature of utilitarianism as an normative
theory (see also e.g. Hammond, 1996), as a positive matter it is likely
to occur when distinct groups of agents are tasked with decision-
making in each time period, as occurs in the setting we study here.
Our work thus falls somewhere on the boundary between normative
and positive analysis: we study positive properties of the equilibrium
consumption choices that would be implemented by sequences of
committees that seek to aggregate their members’ normative views
on social time preferences. Alternative approaches to the aggregation
of time preferences are pursued by Gollier and Zeckhauser (2005),
Jouini et al. (2010), and Millner (2018).
2. The model
We focus on a sequential social choice problem in which a
sequence of committees, each composed of N > 1 members indexed
by i = 1 . . .N, must choose how to consume a public asset. For
the sake of analytical convenience, we assume that N is odd, and
that time is continuous. Each committee exists for a single moment
in time, and controls the value of consumption in that moment
alone. Committee members are drawn from a stable population at
each moment, and their tenure lasts for only that moment. The
distribution of members’ opinions on the PRSTP is assumed to be
independent of time.1
The public asset committees must manage is modeled as a risk-
free asset S that yields a constant (net) rate of return r ≥ 0. If the
asset is consumed at rate Ct at time t, the dynamics of S are given by
S˙ = rSt − Ct (1)
where S˙ = dS/dt, and the initial value of S at time t0 is S0. This sim-
ple model has many possible interpretations. For example, S could be
a stock of environmental quality, a publicly owned natural resource,
or the value of a country’s sovereign wealth fund.
Member i in a committee constituted at time t is assumed to have
discounted utilitarian preferences over future consumption streams
denoted by Vit , with a PRSTP di > 0:
Vit =
∫ ∞
t
Ui(Ct)e−di(t−t)dt. (2)
Committee members have heterogeneous opinions on the appropri-
ate value of the PRSTP, i.e. there exist indices i, j such that di = dj.
We will interpret di as i′s normative opinion on the appropriate rate
of social impatience. Thus, the preferences (Eq. (2)) do not represent
members’ privatepreferencesover theirownconsumption,but rather
1 If N is reasonably large, this is a mild assumption, as sampling variation in
members’ preferred values of the PRSTP will be small. All the results below can be
easily extended to the case of a continuum of committee members (i.e. zero sampling
variation) by taking the limit as N → ∞.
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reﬂect their normative opinions on social preferences. These opin-
ions could arise from ﬁrst-principles ethical reasoning (as in e.g.
Ramsey, 1928; Arrow, 1999; Stern, 2007), or from a revealed
preference approach that identiﬁes social wellbeing with the
satisfaction of consumers’ preferences (as in e.g. Nordhaus, 2008).
We take no stance on which method for specifying the PRSTP is ‘cor-
rect’ in this paper. Indeed, themotivation for examining social choice
rules is that we believe that all the methods deployed in the litera-
ture have strengths andweaknesses, and reasonable people can have
legitimate disagreements on how to proceed.
To focus the analysis on the heterogeneity in views on the PRSTP,
we assume that all members favour the same iso-elastic utility
function:
Ui(C) = U(C) =
{
C1−g
1−g g = 1
lnC g = 1,
(3)
where g > 0 is the elasticity of marginal utility. This assumption
is clearly restrictive, but is necessary to make analytical headway.
We discuss the dependence of our results on this assumption in the
Conclusions. The special case g = 1 will turn out to be especially
useful, as only in this case can all the equilibria we study be solved
analytically.
In what follows, it will sometimes be useful to use shorthand
notation, which we collect here for convenience. We write the
weighted average of the elements of a vector x = (x1, . . . , xN), taken
with weights y = (y1, . . . , yN) (yi ≥ 0,
∑N
j=1 yj = 1) as the vector dot
product
x • y :=
N∑
i=1
xiyi. (4)
In addition, the weighted average of the n-th power of the elements
of xwill be written as
(x)n • y :=
N∑
i=1
(xi)nyi. (5)
Thus, exponents are understood to act element-wise on vectors.
Finally, the unweighted average of the elements of a vector x will be
denoted by
〈x〉 := 1
N
N∑
i=1
xi. (6)
2.1. Utilitarian aggregation
In this subsection, we describe the consumption choices that will
be made if committees make decisions by aggregating the prefer-
ences of their members in a utilitarian manner. That is, we suppose
that a committee at time t adopts a social choice rule that can be
represented by a functionWt , where
Wt =
∑
i
yiVit , (7)
and the weights yi satisfy yi ≥ 0,
∑
iyi = 1.
2 Proposition 1 in
Jackson and Yariv (2015) shows that when committeemembers have
discountedutilitarianpreferences (Eq. (2)) andacommonutility func-
tion, a social choice rule respects unanimity3 if and only if it is of the
form Eq. (7). If in addition we require social preferences to be non-
dictatorial, we must have yi > 0 for at least two values of i. Thus,
utilitarian aggregation embodies two very basic desirable properties
ofpreferenceaggregation in this setting. In the remainderof thepaper,
we assume that yi > 0 for all i, so that the committee’s collective
preferences are sensitive to each member’s favoured discount rate.
An immediate consequence of the heterogeneity of opinions on
discount rates and the utilitarian preferences (Eq. (7)) is that com-
mittees that are constituted at different times will not agree on the
ranking of consumption streams, i.e. their preferences will be incon-
sistent. To see the intuition for this, observe that a committee at time
t1 with preferences (Eq. (7)) would like to assign weight yie−di(t2−t1)
to member i′s views at time t2 > t1. However, from the perspective
of the committee formed at t2, the appropriate weight on opinion i
at time t2 is just yi. Hence, the time inconsistency problem. Indeed,
classical results (e.g. Strotz, 1955) show that the preferences (Eq. (7))
are time consistent if and only if all the members agree on the value
of d, or the aggregation weights yi assign zero weight to all but one
of the members’ views (see also Millner and Heal, 2018).
Outside of these degenerate cases, we can solve for the con-
sumption choices of rational utilitarian committees by treating the
problem as a dynamic game. That is, a committee at t1 rationally
anticipates the consumption decisions of future committees at all
t > t1. The committee at t1 then makes the best decision it can, tak-
ing the choices of future committees as given. This induces a dynamic
game between committees, and we look for sub-game perfect equi-
libria of this game as in e.g. Phelps and Pollak (1968) and Laibson
(1997). Inﬁnite horizon dynamic games of this kind admit many sub-
game perfect equilibria in general (Laibson, 1994; Krusell and Smith,
2003). We use a standard equilibrium selection method to single out
a unique equilibrium. We interpret our inﬁnite horizon model as the
limit of a ﬁnite horizonmodel as the horizon length tends to inﬁnity.4
Under this interpretation, the equilibrium, if it exists, can be shown
to be unique, and to correspond to a linear Markov Perfect Equilib-
rium (MPE) (see e.g. Laibson, 1994; Krusell et al., 2002).5 When the
equilibrium exists under this procedure, we will refer to it as the
‘limit equilibrium’.
To determine the limit equilibrium, we must ﬁnd the linear MPE
of the dynamic game between committees. A Markovian strategy in
our context is a functions(S) such that consumption at time t is given
by Ct = s(St) for all t ≥ t. A strategy s(S) is an MPE if, in the limit as
4 → 0, when committees at times t ∈ [t + 4,∞) in the future use the
rule s(S), the best response of the current committee in t ∈ [t, t + 4)
2 Note that we have assumed that only the social preferences advocated by com-
mittee members at time t are deemed relevant to the aggregation exercise conducted
by committee t. Thus, the current committee accounts for the views of its mem-
bers, but does not account for the judgements of past or future committees. All
intertemporal concerns are captured by current decision-makers’ views on social
time preferences. These assumptions seem to us to capture the problem of choosing
a PRSTP by committee in practice. Future decision-makers have no voice in current
debates on social impatience, so the future is only relevant to the extent that cur-
rent decision-makers are concerned about it. See Millner and Heal (2018) for further
discussion of this assumption.
3 The formulation of this property adopted by Jackson and Yariv (2015) is: Social
preferences S satisfy unanimity iff for all consumption streams C,C′ , a) ∀i,C i C′ ⇒
C S C′ , and b) ∀i,C i C′ ⇒ C S C′ .
4 In a model with ﬁnite horizon T, committee member i at time t′s preferences are:
V˜it =
∫ T
t U(Ct)e
−di(t−t)dt. The inﬁnite horizon limit corresponds to the T → ∞ limit of
the equilibrium of the dynamic game when T is ﬁnite.
5 To clarify, there is always a unique equilibrium of the ﬁnite horizon game, but
the limit of this equilibrium as the horizon length tends to inﬁnity may not exist, as
welfare may become unbounded in this limit.
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is also to use s(S). An MPE is linear if the equilibrium strategy is of
the form Ct = s(St) = ASt for some A > 0.
The next proposition characterizes the limit equilibrium of the
game between committees:
Proposition 1.
1. Assume that the elasticity of marginal utility g ≥ 1. Then, the
limit equilibrium of the game between committees exists and is
given by a consumption rule Ct = s(St) = ASt, where A > 0
is the unique solution of
∑
i
yi
A
di + (g − 1)(r − A) = 1 (8)
that satisﬁes
A < r+
min
i
di
g − 1 . (9)
When g = 1, A may be determined explicitly:
A =
[
(d)−1 • y
]−1
. (10)
When g < 1, A must satisfy Eq. (8) and A > r − minidi1−g . In this
case, there may be no linear MPE.
2. If it exists, the limit equilibrium consumption path is observa-
tionally equivalent to the optimal path according to an agent
with preferences (Eq. (2)), and PRSTP
ˆd = r+ g(A − r). (11)
3. Member i at time t believes that equilibrium welfare is
Vit =
⎧⎨
⎩
(StA)1−g
1−g
1
(r−A)(g−1)+di g = 1
1
di
ln (StA)+ 1d2i
(r − A) g = 1 (12)
in the limit equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
The possible non-existence of a linear MPE (and hence a limit
equilibrium) when g < 1 is a well known feature of models like ours
(see e.g. Phelps and Pollak, 1968). To avoid existence problems, we
assume that g ≥ 1 in the remainder of the paper.6
From the perspective of a committee in any period t, the equi-
librium described by Proposition 1 is ineﬃcient. That is, there exist
feasible consumption paths that would increase its welfare measure
Wt . However, owing to the time inconsistency of committees’ pref-
erences, these paths are not implementable. Any future committee
6 Note that an optimal path in the single agent version of the model only exists if
d+ (g − 1)r > 0, where d is the agent’s utility discount rate (see part 2 of Appendix A).
This condition is always satisﬁed if g ≥ 1, but may fail if g < 1. Thus, non-existence
of an equilibrium is not unique to the dynamic game that arises when preferences are
heterogeneous, but also occurs in a standard optimal control problem with a single
agent.
at time t′ > t can increase its welfare measure by deviating from the
time t committee’s optimal plan. The time t committee knows this,
anticipates the behaviour of all future committees, and reacts opti-
mally to this knowledge. Since all committees behave this way, the
resulting equilibrium is ineﬃcient, but fully rational. Thus, although
each committee’s welfare measure aggregates its members’ prefer-
ences eﬃciently, the interactions between successive committees
lead to an ineﬃcient intertemporal equilibrium.
The observational equivalence between the utilitarian equilib-
rium and the optimal path of a single discounted utilitarian agent
with discount rate dˆ allows us to use dˆ as a summary statistic that
captures how committees behave in equilibrium. Consider the case
g = 1, in which case we have
dˆ =
[
(d)−1 • y
]−1
. (13)
The latter expression is a weighted harmonic mean of members’ pre-
ferred discount rates. To get a very rough understanding of where
this formula comes from notice that the value of a constant utility
stream to a utilitarian committee is:
∑
i
yi
∫ ∞
t
U¯e−di(t−t)dt = U¯
∑
i
yid
−1
i = U¯(
d)−1 • y.
On the other hand, for a single agent with discount rate dˆ, the
value of this utility stream is
∫ ∞
t
U¯e−dˆ(t−t)dt = U¯
1
dˆ
.
Thus, we see that when dˆ is chosen in accordance with Eq. (13)
the utilitarian committee perceives the same ‘present value of time’
as a single agent with discount rate dˆ.
The expression for dˆ is independent of the rate of return r when
g = 1, as income and substitution effects from a change in r exactly
cancel out in this case. When g > 1 however, this is no longer the
case. In Appendix B, we prove that:
Proposition 2. If the elasticity of marginal utility g > 1, ∂ dˆ
∂r > 0 .
This result should be interpreted with care. It does not simply say
that utilitarian committees become more impatient as r increases,
and thus consume more today. While this is true, this just reﬂects
the fact that the income effect of a change in r dominates the sub-
stitution effect when g > 1, a well known result. Proposition 2
however says something stronger. Recall that dˆ is the discount rate of
a single agent who solves the same intertemporal decision problem
as the utilitarian committees — this agent is thus also subject to
the income and substitution effects that arise from a change in r.
Proposition 2 says that in order to match the optimal path of a single
agent to the equilibrium implemented by utilitarian committees, we
need to choose an agent with a larger and larger discount rate as r
increases. Thus, even netting out the effect of a change in r on the
single agent’s optimal path, we still need to increase his discount
rate if we are to match the behaviour of the utilitarian committees.
This suggests that the substitution effect of a change in r is weaker
and/or the income effect is stronger for utilitarian committees than
it is for single agents. Since the single agent and the committees
face the same intertemporal budget constraint by construction, it
must be that the substitution effect is weaker. Indeed, this conforms
to intuition. The fact that the current utilitarian committee cannot
commit future committees to implement the consumption plan it
would like, means that it should rationally reduce its estimate of the
beneﬁts from savings, since it knows that future committees will act
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sub-optimally from its perspective. Thus, an increase in r has less
effect on a utilitarian committee’s ability to substitute consumption
between current and future periods than it does for a single agent
who faces no commitment problems.
2.2. Voting
The fact that utilitarian committees choose ineﬃcient consump-
tion plans in equilibrium suggests that alternative methods for
aggregating member’s opinions could improve on utilitarian pref-
erence aggregation. The most natural alternative to consider is
majoritarian voting. Aside from being widely deployed in practice,
majority rule has been shown to satisfy desirable properties of prefer-
ence aggregation over a larger domain of preferences than any other
ordinal social choice rule (Dasgupta and Maskin, 2008, see also May,
1952). Yet as Sen (2017, p. xxvii) observes, ‘when it comes to welfare
economics, majority decision is not a particularly just, or even plau-
sible, way of judging alternatives’. Sen is referring here to the fact
that decisions implemented by majority rule will generally not pro-
mote more comprehensive measures of social welfare. Indeed, while
majoritarian ballots have been a staple of the positive theory of pub-
lic choice for decades (e.g. Black, 1948; Downs, 1957; Meltzer and
Richard, 1981), they are seldom invoked as ameans to pursue norma-
tive social objectives. We will show below however that our model
provides one instance in which majoritarian voting may be desirable
according to such a normative objective. Voting on consumptionmay
lead all committees to achieve higher levels of utilitarian welfareWt
than attempting to maximize Wt directly.
Suppose that consumption Ct is to be decided by ballot in each
period. In each period t, each committee member may nominate a
single value of Ct . All members vote over each pair of nominated
consumption values, and the value that gets a majority of votes wins
each pairwise contest. A Condorcet winner (if it exists) is a value of
Ct that wins every pairwise contest. If there is a Condorcet winner, it
is implemented.
Since the current choice of Ct inﬂuences the consumption choices
that will be made in future ballots, committee members must antic-
ipate the outcomes of those ballots when forming their preferences
over current consumption Ct . We assume that members are rational,
and thus anticipate the outcomes of all future ballots when forming
their preferences over Ct .7 The following proposition characterizes
the equilibrium consumption path that emerges from this sequence
of ballots:
Proposition 3. Committee members at time t who anticipate the
outcome of votes over public consumption in future periods have single-
peaked preferences over current consumption Ct . Thus, the equilibrium
of a majoritarian voting model with ballots in every period is the optimal
consumption plan of the median member.
Proof. See Appendix C. 
This result may seem to be in conﬂict with the analysis of vot-
ing over consumption streams in Jackson and Yariv (2015). They
show that voting over consumption streams in unrestricted domains
is generically intransitive, and thus voting equilibria cannot be
represented by the preferences of a single individual such as the
median agent. Their analysis assumes however that votes are once
off, whereas in our result ballots are repeated, so that in each period
members are only voting over a single, unconstrained, value of
consumption. The repeated ballot formulation is compelling, as it
7 As in the analysis of the MPE in Proposition 1, we assume a ﬁnite horizon voting
model, and take the limit as the horizon length tends to inﬁnity.
does not require the somewhat far-fetched assumption that mem-
bers believe that a consumption plan that is decided on today will
automatically be implemented by all future committees.
2.3. Utilitarian aggregation vs. voting
We are now in a position to compare the equilibrium imple-
mented by utilitarian committees to that implemented by commit-
tees that vote on consumption.
Our ﬁrst result provides a lower bound on the number of commit-
tee members who prefer the voting equilibrium to the equilibrium
implemented by utilitarian committees:
Proposition 4. In every period, a majority of members prefer the
voting equilibrium to the equilibrium implemented by any utilitarian
committee.
Proof. See Appendix D. 
The heart of the proof of this result is to show that committee
members have single-peaked preferences over dynamic consump-
tion plans that are optimal for some discounted utilitarian agent.
Once we know this, the result follows from the fact that the equi-
librium implemented by a utilitarian committee is observationally
equivalent to the optimal plan of an agent with discount rate dˆ
(see Proposition 1), and the fact that the plan corresponding to the
median agent’s discount rate is a Condorcet winner.
This result is independent of any assumptions about utilitarian
committees’ aggregation weights. Thus, regardless of how such com-
mittees aggregate preferences, a majority of members will think
that voting on discount rates will lead to superior outcomes than
attempting to maximize Wt directly. Next, we take this observation
further by investigating when voting dominates direct maximization
ofWt , according to the welfare measureWt itself.
We begin with a result that does not require any assumptions
about the model’s primitives (i.e. d, y, r, and g). Let d∗ be the discount
rate associated with a utilitarian committee’s most preferred single
agent optimal plan (assuming that this quantity is well deﬁned —we
will prove this below). That is, if Cdt is the optimal consumption path
according to a committeemember with discount rate d, d∗ is given by
d∗ = argmax
d
∑
i
yi
∫ ∞
t
U(Cdt )e
−di(t−t)dt.
In addition, denote the median committee member’s discount
rate by dm.
Proposition 5. Assume that g ≥ 1. Then,
1. Utilitarian committees have single-peaked preferences over
single agent optimal plans.
2. d∗ exists, is unique, and is independent of t. Moreover,
d∗ < dˆ,
wheredˆ is deﬁned in Eq. (11).
3. Voting yields higher utilitarian welfare than the equilibrium
implemented by utilitarian committees if:
d∗ < dm < dˆ. (14)
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The ﬁrst part of the proposition shows that utilitarian commit-
tees inherit the single-peakedness of their members’ preferences
on the space of single-agent optimal paths. Although it is not true
in general that a weighted average of single-peaked preferences is
single-peaked, this does hold for ourmodel. Since utilitarian commit-
tees’ preferences over discount rates are single-peaked, it is useful
to know something about where their ‘bliss point’ discount rate lies.
The second part of the proposition shows that it always lies below the
discount rate that replicates the utilitarian equilibrium. This is intu-
itive, as the commitment problem utilitarian committees face always
causes them to bemore short-termist than they would like to be. The
ﬁnal part of the proposition combines parts 1 and 2 to provide a sim-
ple suﬃcient (but not necessary) condition for voting to dominate
the utilitarian equilibrium. This condition applies regardless of the
model’s primitives, although checking whether Eq. (14) is satisﬁed
requires us to specify these primitives.
In order to progress beyond this general result, we must make
additional assumptions. We begin by examining the case g = 1,
where analytic results are possible, thus enabling clean comparative
statics on the distribution of opinions d. For g > 1, we must resort to
numerical methods.
2.3.1. Logarithmic utility function (i.e., g=1)
When g=1 the equilibrium condition for the dynamic game
between utilitarian committees has a closed form solution (Eq. (10)),
and members’ opinions on welfare in the voting and utilitarian
equilibria can be computed analytically. This allows us to obtain a
sharp result on when voting will dominate utilitarian aggregation,
according to a utilitarian objective function.
Proposition 6. Assume g = 1. Then voting gives rise to higher
utilitarian welfare than direct attempts to optimize Wt if and only if
d∗
dm
ln
(
dˆ
dm
)
<
dˆ
dm
− 1. (15)
where
d∗ =
d−1 • y
d−2 • y
dˆ = (d−1 • y)−1.
Proof. See Appendix F. 
In order to understand the constraints the conditions (14) and
(15) place on the distribution of discount rates in more detail, we
specialise to a natural choice for the vector of aggregation weights y.
Since members only differ in their attitudes to time, a natural com-
parability requirement is that if the consumption path Ct does not
depend on time, all members should contribute equally to the com-
mittee’s utilitarian welfare measure Wt . There is a unique choice of
aggregation weights that ensures this: wemust pick the weight yi on
member iwith discount rate di to be8:
yi =
di∑
jdj
. (16)
8 Equivalently, we could have deﬁned member i′s welfare measure as V˜it =
di
∫∞
t U(Ct)e
−di(t−t)dt, in which case the choice of aggregation weights in Eq. (16)
corresponds to assigning equal weight to each V˜it inWt .
With this choice for y, some simple algebraic manipulations show
that the suﬃcient condition in Eq. (14) becomes
〈d−1〉−1 < dm < 〈d〉, (17)
and the necessary and suﬃcient condition in Eq. (15) becomes
〈d−1〉−1
dm
ln
( 〈d〉
dm
)
<
〈d〉
dm
− 1. (18)
Thus, in this case, the ranking of utilitarian aggregation and voting
depends on the arithmetic mean 〈d〉, the harmonic mean 〈d−1〉−1, and
the median dm.
We illustrate the implications of Eqs. (17)– (18) in an example in
which there are three members with discount rates d1 ≤ d2 ≤ d3.
Deﬁne h12 := d1/d2,h13 := d1/d3. Clearly, 0 ≤ h12 ≤ h13 ≤ 1. Simple
calculations show that Eq. (17) is equivalent to
1
2
(1 + h13) < h12 <
2h13
1 + h13
. (17a)
Similarly, Eq. (18) is equivalent to
3h12
1 + h12 + h13
ln
(
1
3
(1+ h12(1 +
1
h13
))
)
<
1
3
(
1+ h12
(
1+
1
h13
))
.
(18a)
This inequality can be solved numerically to determine the con-
straints it places on h12 for given h13.
Fig. 1 plots the set of three element distributions that satisfy these
conditions. The ﬁgure shows that Eq. (18a) is almost equivalent to
requiring that the distribution of discount rates have positive non-
parametric skewness, i.e. 〈d〉 > dm. The vast majority of distributions
that satisfy Eq. (18a) have this property. However, there is a small set
of distributions that satisfy Eq. (18a), but have 〈d〉 < dm, indicated by
region C in the ﬁgure. The ﬁgure also demonstrates that the condition
(17a), satisﬁed in region B of the ﬁgure, is suﬃcient but by no means
necessary for voting to dominate the equilibrium implemented by
utilitarian committees.
The approximate positive skewness condition needed for voting
to dominate the utilitarian equilibrium in this example conforms
to intuition. When the distribution of discount rates exhibits posi-
tive skewness there is a long tail of large discount rates above the
median. These discount rates have a disproportionate inﬂuence on
the equilibrium implemented by utilitarian committees. If a commit-
tee with aggregation weights (Eq. (16)) could control consumption
for all time, it would choose a consumption path that satisﬁes impa-
tient members in the short run, and patient members in the long
run. Short-run consumption choices are thus always dominated by
the concerns of impatient committee members. However, because
the current committee cannot bind the hands of future committees,
its consumption choice is in effect always short-termist, and thus
impatient members’ preferences exert a large inﬂuence on it. Since
this is true for every committee, the equilibrium consumption path
implemented by a sequence of utilitarian committees will be biased
towards more impatient members. This is reﬂected in the fact that
the equilibrium implemented in this case is observationally equiva-
lent to the optimal plan of an agent with discount rate 〈d〉. It is well
known that the arithmetic mean is sensitive to the large ‘outliers’
that exist when the distribution of d is positively skewed. By con-
trast, the voting equilibrium is robust to the presence of these large
outliers, and is thus not subject to the same distortions.
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Fig. 1. When does voting dominate the equilibrium implemented by utilitarian com-
mittees? The ﬁgure represents all three element distributions of discount rates with
elements d1 ≤ d2 ≤ d3, using the ratios h12 = d1/d2, and h13 = d1/d3, where
h12 ≥ h13. Aggregation weights are given by Eq. (16). Voting dominates utilitarian
aggregation in the region A ∪ B ∪ C. Condition (17), i.e. 〈d−1〉−1 < dm < 〈d〉, is satis-
ﬁed in region B, while A ∪ B is the region where 〈d〉 > dm . Region C is the small set of
distributions for which Eq. (18) is satisﬁed, but 〈d〉 < dm .
2.3.2. More general iso-elastic utility functions (i.e., g>1)
When g > 1, the equilibrium condition (10) must be solved
numerically. In order to do this, we must specify the distribution
of opinions on the PRSTP. We will use a distribution of discount
rate prescriptions elicited from economists who are experts in pub-
lic project evaluation (Drupp et al., forthcoming). This distribution
is illustrated in Fig. 2. In addition, throughout this subsection we
assume that the utilitarian committee aggregates preferences using
the welfare weights in Eq. (16), i.e. yi ∝ di. Given these assumptions,
standard numerical methods can be used to solve Eq. (10), and the
Fig. 2. Distribution of the recommended value of the pure rate of social time
preference d for public project appraisal, from the Drupp et al. (forthcoming) survey
of economists. 180 responses were recorded in the original sample. A kernel density
ﬁt has been applied to smooth out the dataset.
welfare committees achieve under voting and utilitarian aggregation
can be computed as functions of the parameters r,g.
To quantify the welfare differences between the two preference
aggregation methods, it is helpful to have a method for convert-
ing these differences into consumption units. We will make use of
the stationary equivalent of a welfare value W (Weitzman, 1976),
deﬁned as the constant consumption value C¯ that satisﬁes
∑
i
yi
∫ ∞
t
U(C¯)e−di(t−t)dt = W. (19)
When U(C) is iso-elastic with g = 1, the percentage change D
between the stationary equivalent under voting (C¯V ) and utilitarian
aggregation (C¯UA) takes a simple form:
D= 100
[
C¯V − C¯UA
C¯UA
]
= 100
[(
WV
WUA
) 1
1−g − 1
]
, (20)
whereWV is the welfare achieved under voting, andWUA the welfare
achieved under utilitarian aggregation.
We begin by observing that for the distribution of discount rates
in Fig. 2, we have:
d∗ = 〈d−1〉−1 = 1.18× 10−5%, dm = 0.53%, dˆ = 〈d〉 = 1.15%.
Thus, the condition in Eq. (17) is satisﬁed, and we know that vot-
ing dominates utilitarian aggregation when g = 1, for all values
of r. To see whether this result extends to other values of g, r, con-
sider Fig. 3(a), which plots D as a function of r for several values
of g. The ﬁgure shows that for any ﬁxed value of g, voting is pre-
ferred to utilitarian aggregation for lower values of r. For r smaller
than about 2%/yr, voting yields very substantial beneﬁts for all val-
ues of g > 1 (so large that we have cut off the graph to preserve
readability). However, as r increases, the balance tips in favour of
the utilitarian aggregation method. The region of the (r,g) parame-
ter space where each preference aggregation method dominates is
depicted in Fig. 3(b).
The results in Fig. 3(a) and (b) are diﬃcult to explain intuitively,
as we need to know how both equilibria, and the way they are eval-
uated, vary with r and g. Since we do not have an analytic expression
for the consumption path implemented by utilitarian committees,
this is a diﬃcult task. Ultimately, welfare comparisons for g > 1
depend on the empirical details, including the distribution of dis-
count rates. Nevertheless, Fig. 3(b) shows that in our calibration of
the model there is a large region of empirically plausible parame-
ter values where voting yields better utilitarian outcomes than the
equilibrium utilitarian committees would choose for themselves.
3. Conclusions
In this paper, we have contrasted two of the most natural pref-
erence aggregation methods that committees of decision-makers
might employ when attempting to resolve normative disagreements
about social time preferences: utilitarianism, and majoritarian vot-
ing. While in normal circumstances voting cannot hope to compete
with direct optimization of a utilitarian objective function, the time
inconsistency of utilitarian committees’ collective preferences leads
them to implement ineﬃcient consumption plans. We have shown
that this can cause voting to yield better outcomes, according to
utilitarian committees’ own objectives. Indeed, our simple empirical
analysis using an elicited distribution of expert opinions on the pure
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Fig. 3. Voting vs. utilitarian aggregation.
rate of social time preference suggests that this occurs in empirically
plausible cases.
An interesting feature of model is that, regardless of how utilitar-
ian committees aggregate preferences, amajority of decision-makers
will believe society to be better off if committees vote on con-
sumption than if they attempt to maximize their utilitarian welfare
measure directly. There is thus a sense in which majoritarian voting
is ‘self-stable’ with respect to utilitarian aggregation. The concept of
self-stability was introduced by Barbera and Jackson (2004) in the
context of their study of constitutions. A voting rule X for ‘ordinary
business’ (e.g. deciding on discount rates) is self-stable relative to an
alternative voting rule Y if when society votes on whether to change
the voting rule from X to Y, and uses the rule X to adjudicate this
vote, it chooses to stick to X.9 With a little modiﬁcation, we can adapt
this concept to our analysis. If majority voting is also used to decide
whether to use majoritarian voting or utilitarianism to aggregate
members’ preferences, voting will always be selected. By contrast, if
the choice between the two aggregation methods is made based on
9 The deﬁnition of self-stability in Barbera and Jackson (2004) extends to more than
just pairwise comparisons of decision rules, we have simpliﬁed it to ﬁt our setting.
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comparisons of the equilibrium utilitarian welfare they achieve, we
have shown that there are plausible circumstances under which vot-
ing dominates utilitarianism. In these circumstances, majoritarian
voting is self-stable, but maximizing utilitarian objectives is not.
We believe that our results have practical implications for resolv-
ing disagreements about the welfare parameters that enter social
discounting formulae. The social discount rate rt is the rate of decline
of the marginal rate of substitution between future consumption at
time t and current consumption:
rt = −1t ln
U′(Ct)e−dt
U′(C0)
.
If public decision-making is eﬃcient, costs and beneﬁts that are real-
ized at future times t must be discounted using the discount rate rt
(see e.g. Gollier, 2012).
It is clear from the expression above that the PRSTP d is a critical
input to rt — small changes in its value can have a very large impact
on the evaluation of public projects with long-term consequences
(see e.g. Heal and Millner, 2014). In practice, governments revise
their choices of the social discount at semi-regular intervals (Gollier
and Hammitt, 2014), and debates about the appropriate value of the
PRSTP are invariably part of this process. While the processes that
are used to resolve ethical disagreements about the PRSTP are cur-
rently ad hoc and rather opaque, our work takes a more systematic
approach to the aggregation of viewpoints on social impatience. Our
conclusion is that voting on the PRSTP is likely to have advantages
over utilitarian aggregation in practice. Our simple empirical analy-
sis suggests that a consensus value of d ≈ 0.5%/yr could emerge from
such a vote. This value is considerably smaller than that advocated
by e.g. Nordhaus (2008) in his analysis of climate change policy (he
favours 1.5%/yr), but larger than the value of zero advocated by e.g.
Stern (2007) and Gollier (2012) based on their personal ethical views.
The main limitation of our analysis is the assumption that com-
mittee members share a common utility function. This assumption
is made only for technical reasons. It is possible to extend our results
on the voting equilibrium to the case where committee members
favour different iso-elastic utility functions.10 However, solving for
the equilibrium of the dynamic game between utilitarian commit-
tees becomes diﬃcult in this case, as the committee’s preferences
are no longer iso-elastic, and thus the limit equilibrium is gener-
ically non-linear. Similar tractability issues arise for more general
(i.e. non-linear) production functions. Nevertheless, the qualitative
ﬁnding that voting may dominate direct utilitarian aggregation will
continue to hold even in these substantially more complex cases.
Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 1
1. Let the consumption policy function be Ct = s(St) = ASt.
Suppose that committees from t ∈ [t + 4,∞) follow strategy
s(S). The committee at t′s welfare from this is
V(Ct , 4,A) =
∫ ∞
t+4
U(ASt)b(t)dt (21)
where
U(C) =
C1−g
1− g ; b(t) ≡
N∑
i=1
yie
−di(t−t). (22)
10 Examination of the proof of Proposition 3 shows that it can be extended to this
case.
We will not handle the case g = 1 explicitly in this deriva-
tion, as the correct equilibrium conditions for log utility can
be obtained by sending g → 1 in the equilibrium condition
we will obtain for g = 1. St is the solution of the differential
equation
S˙ = rS − AS; S(t+ 4) = S4 (23)
⇒ St = S4e(r−A)(t−(t+4)), (24)
and S4 is the stock of S the current committee bequeaths to
the next committee at t = t + 4. Using the state equation,
and assuming that 4 is small, we ﬁnd
S4 ≈ St(1 + 4(r − Ct/St)). (25)
From now on, the proof makes liberal use of several such
approximations, all of which become exact in the limit as
4 → 0. A straightforward calculation then shows that
V(Ct , 4,A) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
∞ if g < 1 and A ≤ r −
min
i
di
1−g
−∞ if g > 1 and A ≥ r+
min
i
di
g−1
1
1−g (AS4)
1−g∑
iyi
e−[di+(g−1)(r−A)]4
di+(g−1)(r−A) otherwise
(26)
If the current committee believes that the strategy followed
by all future committees leads to unboundedly large neg-
ative (positive) welfare, it will react by sending its own
consumption to zero (inﬁnity). Strategies that lead to inﬁ-
nite welfare integrals thus cannot be part of an equilibrium.
Thus, the equilibrium value of Amust satisfy
A > r −
min
i
di
1− g if g < 1
A < r+
min
i
di
g − 1 if g > 1. (27)
Assuming that these conditions are satisﬁed, we have
V(Ct , 4,A) =
1
1− g (AS4)
1−g∑
i
yi
e−[di+(g−1)(r−A)]4
di + (g− 1)(r − A) .
The current committee’s total welfare is
∫ ∞
t
U(Ct)b(t)dt
=
∫ t+4
t
U(Ct)b(t)dt+
∫ ∞
t+4
U(Ct)b(t)dt
≈ 4U(Ct) + V(Ct , 4,A)
where the approximation becomes exact as 4 → 0. We wish
to solve for current committee’s optimal choice of Ct in the
limit as 4 → 0. We can expand V(Ct , 4,A) in powers of 4 as
follows:
V(Ct , 4,A) = V0 + 4
∂V
∂4
∣∣∣∣
4=0
+O
(
42
)
.
Since the contribution of Ct to welfare in the current period
is ﬁrst order in 4, we care only about the part of V(Ct , 4,A)
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which is also ﬁrst order in 4, and which depends on Ct . Com-
puting the derivative, evaluating at 4 = 0, and keeping only
the terms that depend on Ct , we ﬁnd that
∂V
∂4
∣∣∣∣
4=0
∼ −CtA(ASt)−g
∑
i
yi
di + (g − 1)(r − A) .
Thus, in the limit as 4 → 0, Ct must be chosen such that
Ct = argmax
[
(Ct)1−g
1− g − CtA(ASt)
−g∑
i
yi
di + (g − 1)(r − A)
]
⇒ Ct = ASt[A
∑
i
yi(di + (g− 1)(r − A))−1]−1/g. (28)
In equilibrium, Ct = ASt , so the equilibrium condition for A
is:
∑
i
yi
A
di + (g − 1)(r − A) = 1 (29)
and in addition, we require that A satisﬁes the inequalities
in Eq. (27). When g = 1, we have an explicit solution:
A =
[
(d)−1 • y
]−1
. (30)
To verify that the equilibrium exists and is unique for g > 1,
we must show that Eq. (29) always has a unique solution
when A < r + minidig−1 . When g > 1 the left hand side of
Eq. (29) is a continuous increasing function of A when 0 <
A < r + minidig−1 , and is equal to zero at A = 0. Thus, a nec-
essary and suﬃcient condition for a unique equilibrium to
exist is for the left hand side of Eq. (29) to be greater than 1
when A = r+ minidig−1 . Substituting, we ﬁnd that this requires
⎛
⎝r+ mini di
g− 1
⎞
⎠∑
i
yi
di −min
i
di
> 1. (31)
Since yi > 0 for all i, this condition is always satisﬁed, as the
left hand side of the inequality is always equal to +∞. Thus,
a unique equilibrium exists.
For g < 1, the left hand side of Eq. (29) is no longer generi-
cally a monotone function of Awhen A > r− minidi1−g , and may
be always above 1. Thus, the equilibrium may not exist.
2. Straightforward calculations show that the equilibrium con-
sumption path implemented by utilitarian committees will
be
Ct = S0A exp [−(A − r)(t − t)] . (32)
The optimal consumption path of a single agent with dis-
count rate d can be found using standardmethods from opti-
mal control. The Hamiltonian for such an agent’s intertem-
poral optimization problem is:
H = U(Ct)e−d(t−t) + kt(rSt − Ct) (33)
where kt is the shadow price of the resource, and St evolves
according to
S˙t = rSt − Ct.
A standard application of the Maximum principle yields
(Ct)−ge−di(t−t) = kt
k˙t = −rkt.
Solving the equation for kt, we have
Ct =
[
1
kt
e−(d−r)(t−t)
]1/g
(34)
where kt is the initial shadow price at t = t, whichwe need
to solve for. With this solution, we can write the evolution
equation for the stock at an optimum as:
˙St − rSt = −
(
1
kt
e−(d−r)(t−t)
)1/g
.
Multiplying through by an integration factor e−rt and inte-
grating from t to t:
Ste−rt − Ste−rt = −
∫ t
t
e−rt
(
1
kt
e−(d−r)(t
′−t)
)1/g
dt′
where St = S(t) is the initial resource stock. The transver-
sality conditions on these solutions require:
lim
t→∞ Stkt = limt→∞ Stkte
−r(t−t) = 0.
Hence, the initial value of the shadow price kt must satisfy:
Ste−rt =
∫ ∞
t
e−rt
(
1
kt
e−(d−r)(t−t)
)1/g
dt
from which we ﬁnd
kt =
⎧⎨
⎩
(
g
St
1
d+(g−1)r
)g
if d+ (g − 1)r > 0
∞ if d+ (g − 1)r < 0.
(35)
If d + (g − 1)r < 0, there is no optimal path. When g ≥
1, as assumed throughout the paper, a unique optimal path
exists. Thus in this case, the optimal consumption path of a
single agent with discount rate d is given by
Cdt = S0
[
d+ (g − 1)r
g
]
exp
(
−
([
d+ (g − 1)r
g
]
− r
)
(t − t)
)
.
(36)
Comparing Eq. (36) to Eq. (32), we see that these two con-
sumption paths coincide if we deﬁne the effective discount
rate in the game equilibrium consumption path to be dˆ ≡
r+ g(A − r).
3. Committee member i′s opinion about social welfare in equi-
librium in period t is given by
Vit =
∫ ∞
t
U(Ct)e−di(t−t)dt.
As Eq. (32) shows, the consumption path implemented by
the utilitarian committee is
Ct = StA exp [−(A − r)(t − t)] .
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Substituting into the previous expression and performing
the integral yields the result.
Appendix B. Proposition 2
From Eq. (11), we have
∂ dˆ
∂r
= 1+ g
(
∂A
∂r
− 1
)
. (37)
To compute ∂A
∂r , implicitly differentiate Eq. (8) with respect to r to
ﬁnd
∑
i
yi
∂A
∂r
di + (g− 1)(r − A)
+(g − 1)
(
∂A
∂r
− 1
)∑
i
yi
A
[di + (g− 1)(r − A)]2
= 0.
Multiplying this equation through by A, using the equilibrium condi-
tion Eq. (8) for A, and deﬁning
K =
∑
i
yi
A2
[di + (g − 1)(r − A)]2
,
we have
∂A
∂r
× 1+ (g− 1)
(
∂A
∂r
− 1
)
K = 0
⇒∂A
∂r
=
(g − 1)K
1+ (g − 1)K .
Substituting this result into Eq. (37), we ﬁnd
∂ dˆ
∂r
=
g− 1
1+ (g − 1)K (K − 1).
Now by Jensen’s inequality,
K =
∑
i
yi
A2
[di + (g − 1)(r − A)]2
>
(∑
i
yi
A
di + (g− 1)(r − A)
)2
= 1
where the last line follows from Eq. (8), and the inequality is strict
since we assume there exists di = dj, with yi, yj > 0. Thus, we
conclude that ∂ dˆ
∂r > 0 when g > 1.
Appendix C. Proof of Proposition 3
We begin with a useful lemma:
Lemma 1. Consider the function
W(Ct) = a
C1−gt
1− gDt+
b
1− g ((1+ rDt) St − CtDt)
1−g (38)
where a, b,g,Ct , St > 0. In the limit as Dt → 0, W(Ct) is single-peaked
in Ct .
Proof.
∂W
∂Ct
= aC−gt Dt − bDt((1 + rDt)St − CtDt)−g,
∂2W
∂C2t
= −gaC−g−1t Dt − gb(Dt)2((1 + rDt)St − CtDt)−g−1 < 0.
In the limit as Dt → 0,W(Ct) has an extremum at
C∗t =
(
a
b
)1/g
St > 0.
SinceW(Ct) is strictly concave, C∗t is a global maximum, andW(Ct) is
single-peaked. 
The proof of themain result is by induction. As in our treatment of
the game equilibrium for utilitarian committees, we consider a ﬁnite
horizon model in which the game stops at time T, and take the limit
as T → ∞. In time period t = T − Dt, just before T, a member with
discount rate di has preferences over consumption Ct given by
PT−Dt (CT−Dt , di) = U(CT−Dt)Dt+ e−diDtU(ST ) (39)
where ST = (1 + rDt)ST−Dt − CT−DtDt. Substituting the expres-
sion for ST into PT−Dt(CT−Dt , di), it is immediate that PT−Dt(CT−Dt , di)
is of the form in Eq. (38), and hence is single-peaked in the Dt → 0
limit. A vote at T − Dt thus results in the median member’s opti-
mal value of current consumption being chosen. Now suppose that
the median member’s preferred consumption plan is chosen for all
t ∈ [t+Dt, T], whereDt is very small.We prove that it will be chosen
at t too.
The derivation of the optimal consumption path for an agent with
discount rate d in part 2 of Appendix A can be modiﬁed to a ﬁnite
horizon problem, that terminates at t = T. Imposing the boundary
condition S(T) = 0, it is straightforward to show that if the con-
sumption path followed from t ∈ [t + Dt, T] is the optimal path of
the median agent, we have:
Cmt = St+Dt
[
dm + (g− 1)r
g
]
e−
(
dm−r
g
)
(t−(t+Dt))
1− e−
(
dm+(g−1)r
g
)
(T−(t+Dt))
,
where again
St+Dt = (1+ rDt)St − CtDt. (40)
A member with discount rate di thus has preferences over current
consumption Ct given by
Pt(Ct , di) =
C1−gt
1− gDt+
∫ ∞
t+Dt
1
1− g (C
m
t )
1−ge−di(t−(t+Dt)dt
=
C1−gt
1− gDt+
K ′
1− g [(1 + rDt)St − CtDt]
1−g,
where
K ′ =
∫ T
t+Dt
⎡
⎣[dm + (g− 1)r
g
]
e−
(
dm−r
g
)
(t−(t+Dt))
1− e−
(
dm+(g−1)r
g
)
(T−(t+Dt))
⎤
⎦
1−g
e−di(t−(t+Dt))dt > 0.
By Lemma 1, we thus again know that Pt(Ct , di) is single-peaked in
the Dt → 0 limit. The result follows by induction, and by taking the
limit as T → ∞.
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Appendix D. Proof of Proposition 4
Since the proof of this result is no more diﬃcult with an arbitrary
utility function U(Ct), we will do it in general. Let the optimal pub-
lic consumption plan of an agent with discount rate di be C(di) =
(Cdit )t≥t0 . Since individual members’ preferences are time consistent,
we can prove the result for e.g. t = 0, and be sure that it will then
hold for all t. Thus, C(di) is the solution of
max
Ct
∫ ∞
0
U (Ct) e−ditdt s.t. S˙t = rSt − Ct. (41)
We are interested in members’ preferences over the set of optimal
plans {C(di)}. We begin with a lemma:
Lemma 2. Suppose that:
1. Initial optimal consumption Cd0 is an increasing function of d.
2. Each pair of consumption paths {C(d),C(d′)} has exactly one
intersection point, i.e. for any d′ > d, there exists a time T such that
∀t > 0, (T − t)
(
Cd
′
t − Cdt
)
> 0.
Then all members have single-peaked preferences over optimal
consumption paths.
Proof. Let the optimal consumption path for an individual with
discount rate d be C(d) =
(
cdt
)
t≥0. Denote the preferences over
consumption paths of a member with discount rate d by ≺d.
We ﬁrst prove that under the conditions of the lemma, given any
pair of discount rates d′ < d′′, for any d < d′ we must have C(d′′) ≺d
C(d′), and for any d > d′′, we must have C(d′) ≺d C(d′′). Consider the
case d > d′′, and let d = d′′ + 4, where 4 > 0. We will evaluate
the difference in welfare for a member with discount rate d under
the two consumption paths C(d′) and C(d′′). Let T be the intersection
point of the two consumption streams. We have:
∫ ∞
0
U
(
Cd
′′
t
)
e−dtdt −
∫ ∞
0
U
(
Cd
′
t
)
e−dtdt
=
∫ T
0
[
U(Cd
′′
t )− U(Cd
′
t )
]
e−dtdt −
∫ ∞
T
[
U
(
Cd
′
t
)
− U
(
Cd
′′
t
)]
e−dtdt
=
∫ T
0
[
U
(
Cd
′′
t
)
− U
(
Cd
′
t
)]
e−d
′′te−4tdt −
∫ ∞
T
[
U
(
Cd
′
t
)
− U
(
Cd
′′
t
)]
e−d
′′te−4tdt
≥ e−4T
∫ T
0
[
U
(
Cd
′′
t
)
− U
(
Cd
′
t
)]
e−d
′′tdt − e−4T
∫ ∞
T
[
U
(
Cd
′
t
)
− U
(
Cd
′′
t
)]
e−d
′′tdt
= e−4T
∫ ∞
0
[
U
(
Cd
′′
t
)
− U
(
Cd
′
t
)]
e−d
′′tdt
≥ 0.
The last inequality follows from the optimality of C(d′′). Thus, we
have shown that for any d > d′′, C(d′) ≺d C(d′′). A similar argument
shows that for any d < d′, we must have C(d′′) ≺d C(d′′).
It is straightforward to see that with these properties in hand,
members’ preferences over consumption paths that are optimal for
some discounted utilitarian agent must be single-peaked. Consider
two paths C(d′) and C(d′′), and a member with discount rate d, where
d < d′ < d′′. From the above properties, we must have C(d′′) ≺d
C(d′). Similarly, for any paths C(d′) and C(d′′) with d′′ < d′ < d,
we must have C(d′′) ≺d C(d′). Thus, all members’ preferences are
single-peaked. 
We now show that the conditions of this lemma will always be
satisﬁed. Theorem 2 in Becker (1983) shows that optimal initial con-
sumption is an increasing function of d for any concave production
function. As t → ∞, the path C(d) tends to zero if d > r, and +∞ if
d < r. Thus, the limiting value of Cdt is non-increasing in d. In addi-
tion, all optimal consumption paths are monotonic functions of time
(see e.g. Kamien and Schwartz, 1991). All pairs of optimal consump-
tion paths must therefore cross exactly once. The two conditions
of Lemma 2 are thus satisﬁed, and members have single-peaked
preferences over optimal plans.11
Since the voting equilibrium is the optimal plan for a member
with discount rate dm, and the equilibrium implemented by a util-
itarian committee coincides with the optimal plan of a discounted
utilitarian agent with discount rate dˆ, members have single-peaked
preferences over these plans. Since members have single-peaked
preferences over optimal plans, the classic results of Black (1948)
show that the plan corresponding to dm is the unique Condorcet win-
ner in the set of optimal plans. Proposition 1 also showed that any
equilibrium implemented by a utilitarian committee is observation-
ally equivalent to the optimal plan of a discounted utilitarian agent
with discount rate dˆ. Thus, a majority of agents will always prefer the
voting equilibrium to the equilibrium implemented by any utilitarian
committee.
Appendix E. Proof of Proposition 5
1. Let Cdt be the optimal plan of a single agent with discount
rate d, and deﬁne
Vit(d) =
∫ ∞
t
U
(
Cdt
)
e−di(t−t)dt.
To prove the result it is suﬃcient to show that Vit(d) is a
strictly concave function of dwith a unique maximum for all
i. If we know thisWt =
∑
iyiVit must also be strictly concave
with a unique maximum, and is thus single-peaked. The
uniqueness of the maximum of Vit(d) follows trivially from
the fact that there exists a d such that Cdt is the unconstrained
ﬁrst best for member i, so we focus on proving concavity.
From Eq. (36), we have
Cdt = StB(d)e
−(B(d)−r)(t−t),
where B(d) = 1g (d+(g−1)r). Since B(d) is linearly increasing
in d, it suﬃces to show that Vit is strictly concave in B. We
have
Vit(B) =
(StB)1−g
1− g
∫ ∞
t
e−(1−g)(B−r)(t−t)e−di(t−t)dt
∝ B
1−g
1− g
1
di + (g − 1)(r − B) ,
where we have assumed that B < mini(r+
di
g−1 ), so that the
integral converges for all i.12
11 The proof is nomore diﬃcult for an arbitrary concave production function F(S) that
admits an interior steady state. In this case the steady state value of consumption on a
path C(d) is given by F((F′)−1(d)), which by the concavity of F, is again a non-increasing
function of d. The rest of the proof goes through unchanged.
12 This is without loss of generality since if any agents’ welfare becomes−∞,Wt will
also be −∞. We can thus exclude these paths from our analysis.
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Differentiating twice with respect to B, ignoring common
factors, and deﬁning v = di + (g − 1)(r − B), one can show
that
∂2Vit
∂B2
∝ 2(g − 1)vB− gv2 − 2(g − 1)B2
= −g(g2 − 1)B2 + 2(g2 − 1)(di + (g− 1)r)B − g(di + (g − 1)r)2.
The last line is a quadratic in B, and is strictly negative when
B = 0. The discriminant of the quadratic is
4(di + (g − 1)r)2(1− g2),
and is less than or equal to zero when g ≥ 1. Thus, when
g ≥ 1 the quadratic has no real roots (g > 1), or a single
root (g = 1). Thus, we conclude that for g > 1, ∂
2Vit
∂B2
< 0
for all relevant values of B. When g = 1, ∂
2Vit
∂B2
< 0 every-
where except at a single value of B, and thus Vit is still
single-peaked in B.
2. By part 1 of this proposition, we know that d∗ exists and is
unique and may be determined by solving for the value of B
that maximizes
W(B) =
∑
i
yi
(StB)1−g
1− g
1
di + (g− 1)(r − B) . (42)
If B∗ is the solution of this problem, from our discussion of
Eq. (36) we know that
d∗ = r+ g(B∗ − r). (43)
Since B∗ does not depend on St , we know that d∗ is inde-
pendent of t. Similarly, from Proposition 1 we know that
ˆd = r+ g(A − r)
where A satisﬁes the equilibrium condition (8). Thus, to
show that d∗ < dˆ, we must show that B∗ < A.
Since by part 1 of this proposition W(B) is concave in B,
showing that B∗ < A is equivalent to showing that
∂W(B)
∂B
∣∣∣∣
B=A
< 0.
Differentiate Eq. (42) with respect to B to ﬁnd that:
∂W
∂B
=
S1−gt
B1+g
∑
i
yi
[
B
di + (g − 1)(r − B) −
B2
(di + (g − 1)(r − B))2
]
.
Evaluating at B = A, and using the equilibrium condition
(8), we have
∂W(B)
∂B
∣∣∣∣
B=A
∝
∑
i
yi
[
1− A
2
(di + (g − 1)(r − A))2
]
.
Since
∑
i
yi
A2
(di + (g − 1)(r − A))2
>
(∑
i
yi
A
(di + (g − 1)(r − A))
)2
= 1
we conclude that ∂W(B)
∂B
∣∣∣
B=A
< 0. The result follows.
Appendix F. Proof of Proposition 6
From Eq. (36) in Appendix A, we know that with g = 1 the
optimal consumption path of an agent with discount rate d is:
Cdt = Std exp(−(d− r)(t − t)).
The value of this path to the utilitarian committee at t is:
Wt(d) =
∑
i
yi
∫ ∞
t
ln(Cdt )e
−di(t−t)dt.
Substituting for Cdt and solving for the value of d that maximizes
Wt(d) shows that
d∗ =
[
y • d−1
]
[
y • d−2
] .
From the results in Proposition 1, voting dominates the utilitarian
committee’s equilibrium consumption plan in all periods iff
∑
j
yj
[
d−1j ln dm − d−2j dm
]
−
∑
j
yj
[
d−1j ln
[
y • d−1
]−1 − d−2j [y • d−1]−1
]
> 0
⇐⇒
[
y • d−1
]
[
y • d−2
] ln
[
y • d−1
]−1
dm
<
[[
y • d−1
]−1 − dm
]
.
Substituting the deﬁnitions of d∗ and dˆ yields the result.
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